


# INSIDE TRACK

“green alliance...”

## TAKING THE POSITIVES FROM COPENHAGEN



“the Copenhagen Accord is bad, but campaigning against it would be worse”  
page 9

“this was above all a failure of politics, not process”  
page 10

“the business community has displayed its willing to follow through on the government’s targets”  
page 13

“more progress was made than might at first seem apparent”  
page 15

“the EU will need to be bold, take risks, and invest in concrete action”  
page 18

## COMMENT

The dust is still settling on the Copenhagen summit and we are looking at its implications for where to go next. Who is to blame for the failings, the prospects for progress in 2010 and why the strategies didn't deliver are some of the questions that we and, no doubt, many of you have spent the past month discussing.

Pre-Copenhagen we wanted a fair, ambitious and binding deal, and UK and EU leadership were key to its delivery. But post-Copenhagen, whilst these aspirations remain, how the deal might be achieved looks less clear cut.

This *Inside Track* brings together NGO and business perspectives on the way forward. These views show that, while the questions are many, so too are the answers.

**John Sauven** (page 8) points to failures due to government positions that were in short term domestic political interests. He proposes some fresh ideas to tackle the heart of the problem. **Stephen Hale** offers our view, on page 10, on the importance of more effective national strategies. He outlines some essential elements of an approach that could secure global action on the necessary scale, which he will expand on in our new publication due out in March.

**Stephen Radley** (page 14) asks whether Copenhagen means business as usual for low carbon industry. He remains positive about the sector's prospects in the wake of Copenhagen. And, on page 12, **Roland Rudd** of Business for New Europe urges progressive businesses to put pressure on to create necessary momentum for EU leadership.

The role of the EU is also addressed by **Nick Mabey** on page 16, who focuses on strategies for reviving EU leadership post-Copenhagen, a challenge that has political implications far beyond the climate regime. Movement on the EU budget is key to unlocking a low carbon Europe, the subject of our new publication featured opposite. 2010 could be the year in which the low carbon economy is placed at the heart of the European project.

Finally, from the heady heights of global negotiations to the fundamental question of how to win public support for action, on page 4 we give a taste of *From hot air to happy endings*, our new self-help guide for politicians on climate change communication. On pages 6 and 7 we eavesdrop on a debate between two of its contributing authors, Solitaire Townsend and Tom Crompton, about the value of evolutionary psychology in motivating people.



Tracy Carty, senior policy adviser

### THE QUARTERLY MAGAZINE OF GREEN ALLIANCE

- 2 COMMENT
- 3 CONSERVATISM IN A CHANGING CLIMATE
- 3 UNLOCKING A LOW CARBON FUTURE
- 4 HAPPY ENDINGS
- 6 SAME DIFFERENCE?
- 8 READ OUT FROM COPENHAGEN
- 10 WHERE NEXT?
- 12 A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?
- 14 BUSINESS AS USUAL?
- 16 DOWN BUT NOT OUT?
- 19 GREEN ALLIANCE NEWS

Edited by Karen Crane  
Designed by Howdy  
Printed by Park Lane Press

© February 2010 Green Alliance

Green Alliance's work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No derivative works 3.0 unported license. This does not replace copyright but gives certain rights without having to ask Green Alliance for permission.

Under this license, our work may be shared freely. This provides the freedom to copy, distribute and transmit this work on to others, provided Green Alliance is credited as the author and text is unaltered. This work must not be resold or used for commercial purposes. These conditions can be waived under certain circumstances with the written permission of Green Alliance. For more information about this license go to <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/>



The views of contributors are not necessarily those of Green Alliance.

## CONSERVATISM IN A CHANGING CLIMATE

### Exploring centre-right thinking on the environment

As election year, 2010 will be a fascinating one for environmental politics. In the broadest sense, the environment movement has changed dramatically in the past 13 years. It has become more mainstream, expanding to include business, the financial community and non-environmental third sector organisations such as Oxfam. So, if the government changes colour at the election, what might change in the way we have to think and talk about environmental issues to maintain the interest of a potential centre-right majority in parliament?

To help answer this question Green Alliance has published *Conservatism in a changing climate*, a collection of essays by leading thinkers that explore new ways of talking about old problems. The outcomes sought are familiar: more renewable energy, green jobs, reducing waste to landfill and financing green investment, but the discussions and approaches are very different.


In one of the contributions to the publication, the shadow security minister, Baroness Neville-Jones, argues for greater emphasis on the country's energy security as part of national security. It's not a hard argument to make given the consequences of energy supply shortages and blackouts on the economy and our

general wellbeing. Yet popular environmental debates have focused more on polar bears than national security in the last decade. It is possible that we'll hear a lot more of this kind of argument in the year ahead and this approach might speed up the delivery of renewable energy in the UK.

*Conservatism in a changing climate: security, prosperity and a low carbon future,*

edited by Thomas Lingard & Ben Caldecott (Green Alliance, February 2010) features six viewpoints, including leading Conservative MPs and independent commentators. Available to download from [www.green-alliance.org.uk](http://www.green-alliance.org.uk)

For more information about this work, contact **Thomas Lingard** [tlingard@green-alliance.org.uk](mailto:tlingard@green-alliance.org.uk)



## UNLOCKING A LOW CARBON EUROPE

### New opportunities to address climate change and budget reform in the EU

The Copenhagen negotiations highlighted the weaknesses of the European Union's approach. This wasn't just the result of a poor negotiating strategy, but also reflected its failure to agree a robust internal EU position on such matters as international climate finance or a willingness to make further domestic reductions in carbon emissions.

If Europe is to regain its crucial role as a catalyst for a global agreement then it needs to put in place the domestic political conditions that will allow it to move forward with confidence. With the Lisbon Treaty now in place, and the entry into office of a new European

Commission and president of the European Council, we would argue that 2010 can be the year in which the EU places the low carbon economy at the heart of the European project.

Central to this effort must be the reform of the EU budget. There is arguably no policy lever as important for setting the direction of EU action. While the size of the budget remains close to just one per cent of EU's Gross National Income, it has the ability to lever additional spending by member states and the private sector. However, it is perhaps its political value that is of most influence. The way in which the EU spends its resources is the primary indicator of its political priorities and its institutional ability to organise their pursuit.

With this in mind, Green Alliance has published a new collection of opinions from

diverse businesses and NGOs, social organisations and think tanks, which addresses the political challenge of acting on the two priority areas of climate change and the reform of the EU budget. We believe that movement on the EU budget will help unlock a low carbon Europe, while the continuing pressure for action on climate change can create the momentum required for budget reform.

*Unlocking a low carbon Europe: perspectives on EU budget reform*, edited by Chris Littlecott (Green Alliance, February 2010). Available to download from [www.green-alliance.org.uk](http://www.green-alliance.org.uk)

For more information contact **Chris Littlecott** [clittlecott@green-alliance.org.uk](mailto:clittlecott@green-alliance.org.uk)

# HAPPY ENDINGS

## Understanding what motivates people is the key to good climate change communications

Dealing with climate change has as much to do with understanding people as understanding greenhouse gases. Without an appreciation of human psychology, politicians will find neither workable solutions, nor public support. To paraphrase psychologist Adam Corner, they'll end up with a zero carbon bus fleet with zero passengers.

When it comes to talking to the public about the shift to low carbon living, politicians could be much more persuasive if they understood people better. Luckily, a whole range of disciplines have long had this as their aim, from communications to psychology to marketing. And one product has done extremely well out of distilling this knowledge: the self-help book. Here, under titles adapted from some of the genre's best-selling editions, is an introduction to Green Alliance's new guide for politicians who want to inspire support for climate change policies.

*From hot air to happy endings* (February 2010). Available to download at [www.green-alliance.org.uk](http://www.green-alliance.org.uk)

For more information contact [Sylvia Rowley](mailto:srowley@green-alliance.org.uk)  
[srowley@green-alliance.org.uk](mailto:srowley@green-alliance.org.uk)



### How to talk so people listen: the key to success

Telling a good story is a prerequisite for getting people's attention, never mind their support. Keep talking about impending climate doom and people will switch off quick. Now that Copenhagen is over it's time to stop talking about multilateral agreements and melting icecaps and start telling positive stories about what we can do in the UK. Government needs a desirable vision of a low carbon future and an action plan to get us there. Politicians should inspire people using concepts such as freedom and fairness, not just statistics. And it's crucial to be clear that this problem is not just environmental, but relates to fundamental national concerns such as security.

### Some people are from mars, some are from venus

Politicians need to understand the values that motivate people. Relating the low carbon shift to their current desires, whether that's feeling safe, being popular,

or becoming a better person, is much better than relating it to abstract global problems. But politicians also need to know what they want to get out of their relationship with the public. If you want people to drive electric cars and buy different light bulbs then this approach might be enough. But if politicians expect the public to use less stuff and co-operate more, then they might have to go beyond appealing to dominant values and try to promote more latent ones, such as responsibility and care for others.

### The magic of thinking big

Climate change is a big problem, but some of the suggested solutions have been decidedly small. Variations on "Apocalypse is coming! Green your life in five simple steps" has been the story line to the public for some time. This clearly doesn't stack up, and misses out a crucial part of the story. With a problem on the scale of climate change, we need big solutions and only government can make these happen. Politicians should move from "are you doing your bit?"

campaigns to "we're doing our bit", publicising government action and communicating under the core message "we're doing everything we can to make these changes possible, but we can't do it without your help." With a big overarching story on going low carbon, politicians can ask more of the public, and public action makes more sense.

### Show, don't tell!: secrets of writing

As any budding writer knows, telling people something is much less compelling than showing it to them. Writers can do this through description, politicians through action. Politicians can talk until they are blue in the face, but until people see changes happening, most won't pay any attention. Events like a climate change version of Red Nose Day, visible changes such a clearly branded loft insulation programme, and price signals such as cheaper train tickets would all show people that this is for real. Visible actions take low carbon living out of the realm of speeches and into people's lives.

### Feel the fear and do it anyway: how to turn your fear and indecision into confidence and action

Communicating better could certainly help politicians to get stronger public support for decarbonising the UK. But uncertain public support is no excuse for inaction. To lead us through this crisis, politicians will sometimes need to venture out of their comfort zone. They need to feel the fear and do it anyway. In fact, taking bold action is a vital communication tool in itself, as it shows commitment and reduces the confusing gap between the catastrophe government talks about and its modest actions so far.


# SAME DIFFERENCE?

Solitaire Townsend and Tom Crompton are friends but they see the world slightly differently. They have both contributed to our new publication *From hot air to happy endings*, featured on page 4, looking at how government can communicate better on climate change.

Here we find out how different they really are and eavesdrop on an email exchange between them about what makes people tick and what will work to get the message across:



**Solitaire Townsend** is managing director of Futerra Sustainability Communications Ltd  
[www.futerra.co.uk](http://www.futerra.co.uk)



**Tom Crompton** is WWF UK's change strategist. He writes at [www.identitycampaigning.org](http://www.identitycampaigning.org)

To: Tom Crompton  
From: Solitaire Townsend

Dear Tom

The environment movement can argue within itself with more rage than when confronting climate deniers! And it seems we've been set up for a gladiatorial contest between Identity Campaigning and the Marketing Approach to behaviour change. Personally, I'm not sure either deserve the capitalisation.

I'll tell you a secret Tom, I don't think you're a bearded evangelist preaching homespun values and the evils of consumption, and I'm not a sharp-suited spin-doctor trying to greenwash our way out of climate change. In fact we're both weary travellers striving for the same destination along different paths.

Fancy comparing notes? I've always wanted to ask you. How do you think a shift in values would be possible considering the 'universals' identified by evolutionary psychologists like Steven Pinker?

Solitaire

To: Solitaire Townsend  
From: Tom Crompton

Dear Soli

There's some irony to you proffering the olive branch, when it's me banging on about compassion and empathy: that's not lost on me!

If there is anything to be debated here then evolutionary psychology's exploration of human nature and what shapes it is surely a good place to start. Richard Dawkins, an admirer of Steven Pinker, writes that precisely because we can expect little help from nature, we must "work all the harder for the long term future", recognising that "the human brain is well able to dispense with the ultimate value of gene survival and substitute other values", if we make the collective effort.

It is those other values that must interest us both, because Pinker's fellow psychologists find that values are of crucial importance in motivating engagement around issues like climate change. 'Intrinsic values' - empathy, for example - provide the best motivators of durable change in response to such challenges. Materialistic values, on the other hand, erode motivation for those more difficult changes.

If we are to respond to Dawkin's call to bring helpful values to the fore, then we need to respond to the ways in which particular values come to dominate culturally - as a result of the influence, for example, of public institutions, the media and marketing industries, and (tautologically) our social norms.

Tom

To: Tom Crompton  
From: Solitaire Townsend

Dear Tom

Ah there's the rub. If we dismiss 'blank slate' philosophies and accept what the anthropologist Donald E Brown calls the "psychological unity of mankind" then values aren't entirely an act of free will. Desire for status, for social acceptability and indeed drivers for consumption are pre-programmed into us. Neuroscientists have pinpointed the brain region tasked with buying. Even Neanderthals coveted trinkets. You can't cut that out of people with a values shift.

Embracing those selfish drivers rather than condemning or dismissing them opens up an extraordinary tool for change. Their incredible power must be harnessed to affect behaviours on the most fundamental level. Men don't drive Porsches to get from A to B, but rather for the documented testosterone rush of being seen driving one. Like most high carbon consumption behaviour the object isn't to consume, but to achieve status, hedonic identity or to press another of our built-in buttons. The real job is to find equally 'status imbued' symbols but with radically lower impacts.

You can't substitute a nature walk for a Porsche, not because of our values but because of our programming.

My problem isn't the desire to consume, it's consumption's material impact. The answer must be to substitute not sacrifice.

Perhaps we see people from two different angles, like two people looking at different faces of a Janus sculpture. The question is, how can those two perspectives build a more powerful solution to our common cause?

Solitaire

To: Solitaire Townsend  
From: Tom Crompton

Dear Soli,

I don't think it's just that you and I see people differently: I think people are Janus headed or, at least, are conflicted over what matters to them. And the question must therefore be: "Which aspects of human identity can we most usefully help to bring to the fore?"

The nature/nurture debate surely turns out to be something of a blind alley? Values are shaped by both genetic and cultural factors. There are lots of studies showing that dominant cultural values can shift rapidly, for example, as a result of the introduction of commercial television to cultures that were previously without electricity.

So, can our two perspectives build on one another? You are right that appealing to materialistic values is probably quite the best way of selling both Porsches and Priuses. If only we could weather this perfect storm of profound global challenges by selling different stuff! But if we cannot, then we must ask: "Can appeals to materialism help to create public demand for the necessary and radical changes in the way that we live?"

Clearly they can be of short term help, and on this we agree. But the evidence is that they actively frustrate the emergence of greater public concern about a range of 'bigger than self' problems, of which climate change, of course, is just one.

Tom

To: Tom Crompton  
From: Solitaire Townsend

Dear Tom

We disagree tactics, messages, and perhaps even on who people are. But why should we be any different than generations of philosophers, eh?

But I'm encouraged by the debate.

The real test is to bring about real change with our messages. As always, you have my wholehearted best wishes with that.

Solitaire

To: Solitaire Townsend  
From: Tom Crompton

Dear Soli

Yes, there's no doubt that the approach I'm outlining is ambitious! But clearly we agree that any credible approach has to be ambitious.

Bringing other values to the fore will require concerted action across a broad swathe of organisations - not just the environment movement - and just as I take heart from our joint desire to create change, I'm energised by the growing spread of interest and discussion generally. Maybe next time this discussion will be with some other voices too?

Tom

# READ OUT FROM COPENHAGEN

John Sauven unpicks what happened at the Copenhagen climate summit and why. He sets out a to-do list for campaigners in the aftermath.

**A**t the climate talks in Copenhagen, governments adopted positions that mainly reflected their short-term domestic political interests. Unfortunately, most world leaders knew they would pay a greater price at home for cutting emissions than for defending the status quo. It required leaders with vision rather than politicians with short term domestic agendas. Conventional campaigning around a fair, ambitious and binding (FAB) deal consequently had little impact on this basic political dynamic.

Two main political currents poisoned the Copenhagen negotiations:

The first was an alliance of climate scepticism and big business interests which, along with a recession and political apathy, disabled developed country ambition.

The second was the insistence by powerful developing countries on their indefinite right to pollute. Given that we are demanding a two degrees limit to global average temperature rises, any position based on the concept of 'pollution rights' is hard to defend for much longer. Yet it is wrong to characterise China as just a climate refusenik. China is major investor in clean energy but it is also struggling to provide for its huge population.

As yet, there is no working model of a low carbon economy in a rich country, which could bolster the case inside China, for a more ambitious position on emissions limits. Worse, many developed country governments outsource their emission cuts via offsetting, and hope to do so at an even greater scale in future. The consequence is that the US and parts of Europe are planning for a new generation of coal-fired power stations, whilst simultaneously demanding that developing countries commit to low carbon growth.

Not surprisingly, large developing countries are doing as we do, not as we say. And as long as all the big emitters equate their strategic interests with guarding the largest



possible portion of the carbon pie, this situation will persist.

We need to swallow the uncomfortable truth that, however many times we restate the need for a FAB deal, we will not get one under these conditions; we have to change the prevailing domestic politics in emitting countries first. Climate change requires an international agreement unlike any other. It is exceptional. It requires nations to participate in a radical transformation of the global economy. They will not do so unless they feel they have a workable domestic mandate to act.

This can be illustrated by looking at the game plans of the major negotiating blocs.

The negotiating strategy of powerful players within the G77 + China leadership suggested an agenda which could be characterised as "This western-caused crisis must be cleaned up by the west and the west alone, except for some actions in developing countries which the west can pay for. At all costs, we must limit any obligations on us to act." For many in China and India, defending this position was perceived to be defending their

national interests and sovereignty against assaults by the west.

At the same time, the US was navigating its own political minefield; specifically, to make sure that a new deal did not endanger its domestic climate and energy legislation. This required avoiding the imposition of a top-down target from the UN, and securing concessions (or perceived concessions) from China, particularly on monitoring and transparency.

It proved beyond the diplomatic capabilities of the EU to operate in the rather narrow space between these two superpowers. Deeply divided, they came into the talks arguing for a level playing field on emissions cuts from other countries. Yet, whilst the UK and France (together with Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands) probably were seeking a mandate to move to a 30 per cent cut by 2020, reports from the meeting suggested that others (Italy, Poland and perhaps even Germany and the EU Commission) sought to set the bar high enough to avoid any such increase in ambition. It is not obvious whether a unilateral move to 30 per cent would have provided more traction, as this was never put to the test. And NGOs and progressive business groups in the EU never applied the pressure required to make it happen.

The issues which held up the talks are easily understood against this backdrop.

The weakness of developed country targets, and their waning support for the Kyoto Protocol created an environment in which it appeared legitimate for the G77 + China leadership to refuse to negotiate on many other aspects of a new deal. This included all those elements which might have led to the large developing countries facing emission reduction obligations in the future. The UN process was largely a victim of this political situation.

Some western heads of state have claimed that wrecking tactics have fatally undermined the credibility of the UN. In reality, every group of nations attempts to make the UN work to their

advantage. It just so happened that the objective of the G77 + China – no new obligations for developing countries – could be readily achieved in a process which works by consensus and, therefore, lends itself to stalemate.

Ultimately, however, the UN remains the only institution with sufficient capacity to implement a system of international climate governance, allied to collaborative programmes on issues such as adaptation and forestry. The challenge is to defuse the political aggression around the negotiations, whilst rebuilding confidence in the UN to do the things it does well. The focus must be on the need for sustained high-level engagement in a range of contexts, where climate change is given the foreign-policy priority necessary to drive forward action.

The Copenhagen Accord is bad, but campaigning against it would be worse.

The process in which the Accord was born was bloody and disempowering. Nonetheless, the most constructive response is to find ways to dock and deliver its more positive elements. These include the package of fast-start finance; the proposed panel to look at novel financial mechanisms; and the commitment to deliver action to reduce emissions from deforestation.

Aside from the Accord, however, we need fresh ideas to tackle the heart of the Copenhagen problem: the toxic conflation of pollution rights with national sovereignty and future prosperity.

Here are some ways forward:

**Develop global strategies that impact on the US and China:** With the US and China representing around half of global emissions, we will lose unless we influence their politics. NGOs global strategies must gear up for this challenge.

**Tackle apathy, climate deniers and those undermining action:** We must reassess how we deal with climate scepticism and the growing denial industry.

**Exposing corporate emissions leakage:**

There is an agenda by Big Carbon to ensure that responsibility for emission reductions is outsourced, in particular through land use offsets. We must ensure we retain sufficient domestic ambition to drive technological and social change.

**No indefinite right to pollute:** Avoiding dangerous climate change will require absolute emission limits for large emerging economies in the not too distant future. Civil society voices in emerging economies need to challenge the alignment of national interests with the indefinite right to pollute, whilst continuing to argue for climate justice.

“not surprisingly, large developing countries are doing as we do, not as we say”

**Creative finance:** Many ambitious developing country targets (Indonesia, Brazil etc) are dependent on finance. We need to secure the Tobin Tax, a tax on currency speculation across borders, currently under discussion at the IMF.

**Create a European showcase for low carbon prosperity:** Europe remains the only major bloc with the near-term potential to become a showroom for clean technologies. We need to prove a low carbon economy can actually be delivered.

**Rethink campaign strategies based on influencing international processes, rather than domestic politics:** In the short to medium term, we should not campaign for a UN 'uber-deal' as

the prerequisite for action on climate change. Instead we should focus on building a domestic (and EU) mandate for action, and nurture the UN's role in providing the scientific underpinning, governance and operational aspects of a future climate regime.

**Rethink how we use popular support to shift domestic and international politics:** We need to consider more carefully how to use public mobilisations in the most effective way. How do we keep supporters empowered whilst ensuring what they do actually has real political traction?

Copenhagen was never going to be easy. People might be beginning to realise how much power humanity has to change the global ecosystem. But it also starkly exposed how hard it is to tailor our politics and economics to reflect that reality. The take home message from Copenhagen must be that the impetus for action lies with us at home tackling issues like new coal-fired power stations and energy wastage. The future, when it comes to emission reduction pledges, will be more bottom up and less top down. The UN still has a key role but we have to prove that a low carbon economy can be delivered. The proof of the pudding is always in the eating.



John Sauven is executive director of Greenpeace UK [www.greenpeace.org.uk](http://www.greenpeace.org.uk)

# WHERE NEXT?

**Stephen Hale** asks where political leadership should focus next. He stresses the importance of more effective national strategies and outlines some essential elements to securing global action.

**S**o Copenhagen didn't 'save the world', as some hoped. Some reactions to the outcome of the summit presented it as virtually the end of the world. It was deeply disappointing. But the real test is not the outcome of a single summit. It is our ability to establish the political climate for governments to act and achieve steep emissions cuts over the next five to ten years.

If we are to achieve this, it is critical that we develop a shared analysis of why the final agreement was so limited.

The UNFCCC process was a major cause. The summit and earlier preparatory meetings were characterised by lengthy disputes over process that were astutely manipulated by those opposed to a strong outcome. The existing processes exacerbate policy differences and make it very difficult to establish trust and a sense of shared endeavour. It is critical that we find more effective ways to conduct future international negotiations, whilst retaining the UN's primacy as the one body with truly global legitimacy.

Yet this was above all a failure of politics, not process. We must confront the fact that too many countries still put climate change second to concerns of economic growth and energy security, and do not recognise the critical importance of a stable climate to our future prosperity and security. As a result, the prospects for an international breakthrough in 2010 are currently very low. Our task now is to identify how we create a political climate not just for an effective treaty, but for the action that must follow it. This is ultimately a domestic challenge in each of the key countries.

The approach we take internationally can significantly increase domestic support for action.

There are three essential elements of a new approach to international action.

First, we need to create a shared analysis of the urgency, and the economic and human case for action. Not enough countries recognise the need for collective action in line with the scientific evidence. This prospect will be much improved if our political leaders come together to champion new initiatives, supported by countries of both north and south. With good diplomacy, the United



**too many countries do not recognise the critical importance of a stable climate to our future prosperity and security**



Nations, G20, World Bank and others could all play leading roles. There are four areas where our political leaders can capture public attention and set an agenda for the future:

- analyse the potential human and economic costs of the current global response, and the four to five degree rise in average global temperatures that it could deliver;
- analyse the opportunities presented by a more rapid global transition to a low-carbon future;
- highlight the costs to business of the existing approach, and create pressure for more constructive engagement; and

– make the security case for more action.

This requires political courage. It will mean world leaders acknowledging the inadequacy of the Copenhagen Accord, and developing the case for more ambitious action on targets, finance, technology and other issues. Many recognise this privately already, and will support initiatives of this kind.

Second, we need to dramatically step up global co-operation, to act now in areas such as forests, renewables, carbon capture and storage and finance for adaptation where there is widespread agreement and a need to act globally. The EU has been most active here. Over the past two years there has been a marked increase in rhetorical commitment in other fora. The G8 and the Major Economies Forum have set shared goals and agreed to co-operate on issues such as carbon capture and storage plants and renewable energy.

But these discussions have not so far led to meaningful co-operation. Agreements on carbon capture and storage, for instance, have not yet led to the construction of a single large-scale CCS plant. Success will require greater co-operation at all levels, to cut the costs of action. The EU can and should be at the forefront of this.

Third, we need to persuade countries to 'make promises they can't break'. A legally binding global treaty is vital. This has widespread support, but resistance from China in particular has diminished international confidence that it can be achieved. A legal treaty that binds nations together will provide a much stronger signal to investors, and contain stronger mechanisms for monitoring and reporting.

A treaty will not ensure that countries make unbreakable promises. So we also need a far more effective institutional framework. Alex Evans and David Stevens have written persuasively on this in *An Institutional architecture for climate change* (March 2009). They propose annual reporting by an independent institution along the lines of a central bank, and enforcement mechanisms that would make carbon default a major risk for nation states.

Action in these areas would help secure the global commitments we need. But the negotiation and, more importantly, the delivery of this will depend above all on the domestic politics of the key countries. So the most pressing challenge post-Copenhagen is to design successful national climate change strategies.

This will require an approach that delivers on economic and social grounds as well as environmental; reorientating economies away from high carbon emissions, creating jobs and managing the potential social impacts of a transition. The perception that these issues are in conflict has been a major cause of the limited support for climate change policy so far. There are significant challenges in reconciling short-term tensions between these objectives. But it is possible to do so. Unless this is achieved national governments will be unable to make a convincing case to their electorates for ambitious climate change policy.

There are several dimensions to a successful approach. My forthcoming pamphlet will outline the key elements of good policy design, and the processes needed to secure it. But the most important elements relate to political strategy.

First, we must capture the public's attention by highlighting and delivering the opportunities that climate change policy presents. This can only be achieved if those responsible for economic and industrial policy are persuaded to play a leadership role. There are a number of compelling examples of countries adopting this approach, and securing substantial gains as a result. The scale of the opportunities, particularly in the short-term, should not be exaggerated. But the political opportunity to highlight, secure and celebrate wealth creation and employment from the low carbon transition is certainly there to be grasped.

Second, we need more flagship policies that are politically popular and deliver real, visible benefits to the public. These include higher fuel efficiency standards, in response to concerns over oil imports; energy efficiency programmes that cut bills and create jobs; and smart technology in the home that increases awareness and cuts household energy bills.

Third, governments should place a much stronger emphasis on tackling the potentially significant impacts on both the poor and businesses in certain sectors. The distributional impacts of climate change policy are potentially serious, unless mitigated through policy design. There is a strong moral case for this, given the inequity of imposing proportionately higher costs on those less able to pay both environmental taxes and energy bills. There is also a strong political case, given the high risk of public hostility to inequitable approaches.


Climate change is above all a political problem. We know a great deal about the science; we have a mix of technologies within reach, and


we are increasingly clear about the policies that would help to deploy them. However, we have not developed political strategies that create the necessary social foundations for government action. This is a challenge for the voluntary sector of course.

But the approach taken by politicians can greatly strengthen public support for action. National governments hold the key to success. The critical task for 2010 and beyond is to develop new strategies to drive emissions reduction, and secure the deeper public support that will make action politically sustainable. Internationally, we need to rebuild momentum by developing a stronger shared analysis of the need for action, and co-operating now in areas where there is widespread agreement. If we do so, the negotiations of 2009-10 can still secure prosperity and security.



**Stephen Hale** is director of Green Alliance. His new pamphlet *Post-Copenhagen: the commandments of climate change strategy*, will be published in March 2010. For more information about Green Alliance's Political Leadership theme, go to [www.green-alliance.org.uk](http://www.green-alliance.org.uk)





# A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?

There is a strong case for EU leadership on climate change after Copenhagen. **Roland Rudd** urges businesses to press for ambitious targets.

As world leaders gathered in Copenhagen last December for the United Nations Climate Change Conference, President Sarkozy of France delivered a rallying cry, urging those gathered, including over 120 leaders, to put aside their differences and agree upon the instruments necessary to tackle climate change. He said, "Time is against us, let's stop posturing... A failure in Copenhagen would be a catastrophe for each and every one of us". Looking back at what many consider to be the failed Copenhagen negotiations, there is a widespread belief that a golden opportunity has

been lost. Whilst more should have been done, they were not a complete failure and the negotiations resulted in significant progress that can form the basis of further and essential action.

The Copenhagen Accord, backed by the majority of world leaders, agreed on a long-term target of limiting global warming to no more than two degrees Celsius. Developed and developing countries, including the United States, China, India and Brazil, publicly agreed to make substantial reductions in their greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, developed countries have committed to providing \$30 billion over the next three years, and \$100 billion per year by 2020, to

address the needs of poor countries suffering from the impact of climate change. While these are undoubtedly important and necessary steps, they are not sufficient, and must be followed by a firm timetable for the creation of a legally binding Treaty, ideally by the end of the year at the COP16 talks in Cancun, Mexico. This is a matter of political will and the United Nations, the European Union, and all those who want to see an agreement must redouble their efforts to drive this forward.

As part of the agreement reached under the Copenhagen Accord, developed and developing countries will announce their targets

for reducing emissions by 31 January. Under its ambitious 20/20/20 package, the EU announced a 20 per cent reduction in emissions and offered to increase this to 30 per cent in the event of a global deal. At Copenhagen, the EU did not come under any pressure from other countries to raise its targets, as this allows them to adhere to the lower end of their targets as well. This inaction and reluctance to increase global targets has left us with a gap between what we are willing to do, and what scientists are telling us we need to do.

Therefore, the question that arises is whether the EU should act unilaterally, and follow through on its commitment to move towards a 30 per cent reduction in emissions, irrespective of other developing countries committing themselves to comparable targets. The increase is not as drastic as it appears; when carbon offsetting measures are taken into account, we are almost (about 90 per cent) there in terms of reaching the 20 per cent reduction target. Those in the business community who are serious about a green economy, and are taking steps towards it, must put pressure on EU member states to move towards the higher end of the EU's target to cut emissions. The current target of 20 per cent does not place pressure on companies to adopt green measures, and means that those companies which have adopted such measures would be at a competitive disadvantage. On the other hand, a 30 per cent reduction would aid the transition to a low-carbon economy, and create millions of new jobs and save billions of euros thanks, in part, to lower oil and gas import bills. Furthermore, by raising its targets, the EU would be leading by example and in doing so, encourage others to do the same.

At Copenhagen, we witnessed the enormous changes that have occurred in geopolitics over recent years and their implications for the green economy. The negotiations failed to reach a substantive agreement because a small number of countries, primarily from South America and Africa, scuppered a global agreement at the behest of China. How can we ensure that the same doesn't happen again in Cancun? If we are serious about resolving the issue of climate change, European governments and businesses must persuade developing countries that their interests lie with the EU and the United States in achieving a solution, rather than in following China down the road of not doing enough.

For example, Africa could benefit enormously from a global carbon trading system. At present, the carbon trading system disproportionately benefits China, almost to the exclusion of everyone else. The majority of funds

generated by it go to China, with Africa receiving about three per cent. We need to change this system, and by changing the system, persuade developing countries in Africa, South America and other parts of the globe that their future lies with Europe.

Closer to home, while the EU has made strong progress, and played a leading role in forging a policy framework and the instruments necessary to deal with climate change, far more remains to be done. Take the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for example. Commencing operations in 2005, it is the largest cap and trade scheme in the world and covers more than 10,000 energy and industrial installations across the EU. While it is a groundbreaking initiative, and one that helped establish Europe as the leading centre for carbon trading, few would consider it a runaway success. A number of issues need to be addressed. First, it fails to take into account emissions from deforestation, which account for 20 per cent of global emissions. Second, about 90 per cent of the

“the negotiations resulted in significant progress that can form the basis of further and essential action

” pollution allowances are currently handed out at no cost, leading to accusations that the ETS is governed more by politics than economics. However, this should change from 2013 when there are plans to auction some 60 per cent of the allowances, with this proportion increasing over time. Third, some argue that its carbon pricing signal has not been strong enough to have a significant impact on capital intensive energy investment decisions. The introduction of the EU ETS was a bold move; however, policy-makers must take the steps that will ensure its success in the long run.

The EU can also do more in the area of energy technology innovation, where we lag behind other countries, particularly the United States and Japan. We need to minimise our reliance on traditional sources of energy by exploring new technologies. Innovation is a key element of the change process, and we believe that the business community has the resources and the motivation to do more in this area. Rio Tinto, for example, is working to create a

blueprint for the mine of the future and advanced smelting technology that will bring change to the aluminium industry. In addition, they are highly active in the development of carbon capture and storage technology; a process which prevents the carbon emissions of fossil-fuel based power stations from entering the atmosphere and is recognised as an imperative for tackling climate change.

The business community has displayed its willingness to follow through on the government's targets. Now, it is time for EU leaders to match their rhetoric with concrete actions. Indeed, in research conducted by the MORI Captains of Industry survey, 79 per cent of business leaders in the UK agreed that the European Union should play a greater role in helping to combat climate change (with only 14 per cent disagreeing). While many have criticised the Copenhagen Accord, the EU should provide the leadership necessary to ensure it is a step on the long road towards countering the threat of climate change, and building a green and sustainable future.



**Roland Rudd** is chairman of Business for New Europe, an independent coalition of business leaders articulating a positive case for reform in Europe. [www.bnegroup.org](http://www.bnegroup.org)

# BUSINESS AS USUAL?

Stephen Radley looks at the prospects for the low carbon industry in the wake of Copenhagen.

Fossil Fuels  
Coal-Fired Power  
Low Carbon  
Oil  
Gas

**T**he widely held perception is that Copenhagen was a disappointing failure. The much-hyped climate talks certainly failed to deliver what many had hoped for: a historic deal binding both developed and developing nations to significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. This prompted some to predict environmental doom unless the international community got its act together in time for the follow-up talks in Mexico later this year. Putting aside the environmental implications, where does it leave low carbon industry?

The major concern voiced by the business community is that the failure to broker a global climate deal creates uncertainty over the long term future of the market for low carbon goods and services. Crucially, what will happen after the existing climate treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, expires in 2012? Some fear this uncertainty could hold back investment in low carbon industry until such time as there is greater clarity. Other disappointments include the lack of progress on creating an international market for carbon and on agreeing an intellectual property rights framework for technology transfers.

It wasn't so long ago that the low carbon market looked unstoppable. The global economy was in rude health and low carbon industry one of its brightest prospects. Politicians, analysts and environmental commentators were falling over themselves to gush about the wealth of business opportunities created by the move to a cleaner and greener economy. So could something as fundamental as what our very own Gordon Brown was fond of referring to as the "green industrial revolution" really be derailed by the outcome of a single international conference?

In an ideal world, the low carbon market would be underpinned by a binding and long term global agreement setting out exactly how much, by whom and by when emissions would be cut. Better still, a truly global market for carbon would exist. With many green technologies, such as most forms of renewable energy, still dependent on subsidies to be competitive, this would significantly reduce the political risk associated with long term investments in the low carbon sector.

Back in the real world, however, all markets and investments are subject to some degree of risk and uncertainty. Managing risk and dealing with uncertainty are integral parts of running most businesses. So the important questions to ask are: 1. has Copenhagen really increased uncertainty for investors? and 2. are international negotiations as important a driver of low carbon markets?

In fact, there are very good reasons to remain positive about the prospects of the low carbon sector in the wake of Copenhagen. First, a realistic assessment of Copenhagen

suggests more progress was made than might at first seem apparent. The positions of the key players have moved closer together and genuine progress has begun to be made on some of the major stumbling blocks. Second, growth in the low carbon sector is underpinned by a wide range of factors, many of which are independent of international negotiations.

“

there are very good reasons to remain positive about the prospects of the low carbon sector in the wake of Copenhagen

”

Arguably the Copenhagen process actually delivered most of what could have been realistically expected, it moved the agenda forward, elicited significant changes in the positions of some of the key players and secured some modest but important agreements.

The world's two largest emitters, China and the United States, made unprecedented commitments to cut their emissions as the focus on climate change intensified in the run up to Copenhagen. The United States, whose stance had previously been seen by many as a major obstacle to a global deal, pledged to cut its emissions by 17 per cent by 2020, subject to Congressional approval. China committed to significantly reining back growth in its emissions by announcing that it would reduce its 'carbon intensity', the carbon dioxide emissions per unit of output, by 40-45 per cent by 2020. Both these pledges represent major policy shifts in the world's two largest markets for low carbon goods and services.

Just as importantly the developed world made a firm commitment to provide significant financial support to help developing nations cut their emissions and adapt to climate change, disagreement over which had previously been a major sticking point in negotiations. Under the terms of the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, \$30 billion worth of funding between 2010 and 2012 and \$100 billion a year by 2020 were agreed. Not insignificant commitments for countries only just recovering from the most damaging recession in generations.

From the standpoint of previous environmental negotiations, these are no mean achievements. Take the Montreal Protocol, which ultimately phased out the use of ozone-damaging CFCs and is now widely viewed as a major success story. Initially progress was slow and it took several rounds of negotiations across two

decades to secure a global ban on CFCs. In comparison, climate negotiations are relatively young and significantly more complex.

Whilst acknowledging the progress made during the Copenhagen process, it is also important not to overstate the influence of the international negotiations on low carbon industry. The global market, now worth £3 trillion a year, has grown rapidly over the past decade against the backdrop of a weak international treaty. The Kyoto Protocol only binds 37 countries to cut their collective emissions by five per cent compared to 1990 levels. Strikingly, there is no clear link between treaty obligations and location, or investor confidence in low carbon. The United States and China, neither of which have obligations under the Kyoto Protocol to cut their emissions, have nonetheless emerged as the two largest markets and venture capital destinations for low carbon.

The reality is that growth in the low carbon sector is being driven by a range of powerful and well-established trends. Demand for low carbon goods and services is far more dependent on factors like national concerns about energy security, growing environmental awareness amongst consumers and rising energy prices as the depletion of fossil reserves accelerates than it is on crafting the perfect international treaty.

“

arguably the Copenhagen process actually delivered most of what could have been realistically expected, it moved the agenda forward

”

The perceived failure at Copenhagen only serves to reinforce the importance of regulations and incentives to drive low carbon industry in the key markets of North America, Europe and East Asia. Arguably, whether or not the US Senate passes the cap-and-trade bill, which would create the world's largest carbon market but is currently dividing opinion in Washington, is far more significant than whatever goes on at the UN. Here in the UK, we need to redouble our efforts to ensure that we offer an attractive business environment for companies and develop an ambitious industrial strategy to exploit the business opportunities which the move to a low carbon economy presents.

If international climate talks lose momentum in 2010 rather than building on the progress achieved at Copenhagen, the UN process risks becoming an increasingly marginal sideshow for low carbon industry.



**Stephen Radley** is chief economist and director of policy at EEF (Engineering Employers' Federation) [www.eef.org.uk](http://www.eef.org.uk)

# DOWN BUT NOT OUT?

Nick Mabey on reviving the EU's political strategy after Copenhagen.



**A**s immediate emotions fade, space is opening for more measured reflections on the lessons of Copenhagen. Nowhere is this more important than in Europe, where some commentators are gleefully proclaiming the end of multilateralism and asserting the marginalisation of European power. These readings of Copenhagen are wrong. The real lesson is that an active EU remains central to preventing catastrophic climate change, but the EU needs to match its political strategy to the geopolitical realities which Copenhagen so starkly revealed.

## Time to plan for 4°C?

In many ways the outcome of Copenhagen remains uncertain. The ongoing negotiations could lead to a legally binding international agreement, a weak voluntary regime or a drift into endless talks like the Doha trade round. But in one way the outcome is clear; whatever happens we have not delivered a reliable basis for future climate security.

From their negotiating positions at Copenhagen it seems that China, India and other major economies have yet to decide that limiting climate change to below two degrees is in their national interest. This means that infrastructure planners, security strategists and other policy-makers should be basing their investment proposals on the probability of a three to four degrees future. This will drive increases in costs in the short-term, but only by making explicit the real consequences of the post-Copenhagen emissions trajectory can we motivate a more ambitious response.

## It was the politics, stupid!

Despite the calls for moving the climate process outside the UN, it is clear that putting leaders in a different room will not change the fundamental political dynamics. The run up to Copenhagen saw leaders and ministers discuss climate change at the G20, Major Economies Forum, UN

Climate Summit and countless bilateral and regional meetings. Most routes have been tried and there is no magic bullet. In fact some participants feel these near-negotiations distracted countries from the real business of textual negotiation. While UN processes can certainly be improved, it is the politics at national level, above all, that need to change.

## Understanding the new global order

The Copenhagen negotiations brutally exposed the emerging power dynamics of the 21st century. China's active role in creating the 'BASIC' group (together with Brazil, South Africa and India) took most seasoned diplomatic observers by surprise. This move overturned decades of China's 'peaceful rise' policy, where it took care



whatever happens we have not delivered a reliable basis for future climate security



to align with the G77 group of developing countries and show that it accepted the existing global order. The result was to split the G77 as a negotiating force at Copenhagen, marginalising Africa and the Least Developed Countries.

The long term sustainability of the BASIC group is unclear as these countries have fundamentally different positions on climate change issues; ranging from a firm commitment to a two degrees target and a binding global regime in South Africa to ambivalence on both counts in India. The group is held together by wider geopolitical interests which, at least temporarily, have trumped their climate change positions.

A big political loser from Copenhagen was low carbon industry. Despite a flurry of CEO

statements from cleantech companies on the need for a deal, they had little impact on the negotiations. Governments listened instead to incumbent industry calls for caution and against unilateral action. Cleantech companies only have themselves to blame. Most of their corporate lobbying resources were devoted to defending their intellectual property rights (IPR) in the negotiations, not supporting the overall deal.

The last night stitch-up between the US and China was not the act of a new strong G2 coalition, but rather a moment of détente between two rival powers which served their short-term interests. The US gained a weak agreement to international monitoring of Chinese emissions, which pleased the Senate, and the Chinese avoided binding commitments. This type of G2 alliance cannot create action on the global stage, but it can block anything it doesn't like.

## Rejecting the siren call of EU irrelevance

The power to block is not the same as the ability to forge solutions. The EU was marginalised from one part of the final deal at Copenhagen, but it was central to most of the positive progress on climate change achieved over the past year.

The EU initiated much of the content of the Copenhagen Accord, but lacked a workable political strategy to deliver the high ambition deal it wanted.

The elements of Europe's power are unchanged: the world's largest economy; largest trading and investment block; biggest aid donor and most advanced low carbon technology provider. But Copenhagen has generated emotional barriers to leadership; many Europeans seem comfortable as followers of the US and China. This is a fantasy foreign policy which would fail the European people. A key lesson of Copenhagen is that nobody, especially not the US, will deliver on European interests except Europe itself.

Only Europe has the economic weight, public political support and strategic alliances required to mobilise an effective global coalition for climate action. But Europe can only lead in a way which fits its assets and legal character, as a pathfinder in developing the elements of the low carbon economy; an enabler of practical co-operation and other countries' domestic action; and a convenor of a progressive political coalition to build an effective climate regime. Copenhagen showed that Europe succeeds when it works in ways consistent with its soft power nature, and marginalises itself when it tries to wield hard power threats.



putting leaders in a different room will not change the fundamental political dynamics



To avoid the mistakes of the past, the EU will need to be bold, take risks, and invest in concrete action at home and abroad. This is not a strategy which guarantees success, but it is the only strategy that has a chance of success. The UK and France back an active strategy. Poland and Italy seem opposed. Germany still seems ambivalent following Copenhagen. The debate is still finely poised.

### Elements of a European strategy

The passage of a US Climate and Energy Bill could provide additional political impetus into the next UN climate conference in Cancun at the end of 2010. In the absence of a strong US bill it seems unlikely major progress will be made. The EU should play a balanced game, pressing ahead where it already can and being prepared to respond swiftly when political conditions improve.

Domestically, the EU should accelerate action on driving the low carbon transition. The recession means that the next five years are economically the best time to undertake major investments in energy efficiency, low carbon innovation and renewable energy. Material costs are low and there is a great need for new jobs in Europe. Given the fall in European emissions, these economic benefits will only be delivered if Europe moves to a 30 per cent target and thus creates stronger incentives for private investment. This goal is now less costly to achieve than estimates made in 2008 for delivering the currently agreed 20 per cent reduction target.

Europe should rapidly review its low carbon international co-operation and prioritise relationships with progressive countries like Mexico, Indonesia and Brazil. Fast start finance should be directed towards countries which showed the will at Copenhagen to develop low carbon growth plans, and which supported ambitious global action. The EU should also prioritise delivery of the Major Economies Forum commitment of doubling investment in low carbon R&D and drive forward international technology partnerships in areas such as carbon capture and storage.

In the international negotiations, the EU should take the initiative in building elements of a new UN regime based on parts of the Copenhagen Accord. Rapid progress should be made on mobilising innovative climate finance, completing work on technology mechanisms, and fleshing out systems for measurement, reporting and verification (mrv) systems. The EU should also test the appetite for interim sub-agreements such as a package combining action on deforestation and international aviation and maritime emissions.

To strengthen the political foundations for future action, the EU should drive analysis of climate change threats to international security, development and humanitarian cooperation and get serious about climate change diplomacy, especially with the BASIC countries. Priority areas include strengthening the climate resilience of transboundary water regimes in Africa; promoting

mandatory disclosure of corporate carbon liabilities at the OECD; and supporting energy subsidy removal through the G20.

### Public voices and political choices

The EU's response to Copenhagen will have political implications far beyond the climate change regime. For, if Europe is unwilling to lead in an area where it has collectively invested billions of euros in driving a global agenda, what chance is there for it to be a global actor on any other issue?

Polling repeatedly shows that the European public see the EU as essential to tackling global issues like climate and energy security. Europe's relevance as a political grouping will depend on its competence in delivering these public goods for its citizens. Over the next few months European citizens must make their voices heard over the noise of incumbent industries and press their leaders for continued strong action on climate change.



**Nick Mabey** is founding director and chief executive of E3G. [www.e3g.org](http://www.e3g.org)

## GREEN ALLIANCE NEWS

### INTRODUCING...



...Richard Booth Green Alliance's events co-ordinator. From sending out the email invitations to making sure there's enough drink to go round, he is the one with the handle on the finer details that make our events run so smoothly. Richard is also first point of contact and manager of the programme of events for our business circle members. Contact him at [rbooth@green-alliance.org.uk](mailto:rbooth@green-alliance.org.uk) 020 7630 4515

### TEDDY GOLDSMITH GREEN FINANCE BLOG



One of Green Alliance's founding members, Teddy Goldsmith, died in August 2009, aged 80. Teddy was at the inaugural meeting of Green Alliance in October 1978. A writer and gifted raconteur, he was best known as founder, publisher and editor of *The Ecologist* magazine. He was ahead of many in raising concerns about climate change. A special issue of *The Ecologist* in 1972, *Blueprint for survival*, proposed the formation of a movement for sustainability which led to the foundation of the party that went onto become the Green party.

The new blog under our Sustainable Economy theme is focused on the rapidly growing debate on new ways to finance the low carbon transition. It's a space for commentary on events, publications and speeches in the field of green finance policy. We want it to be a resource to build and disseminate ideas, and an entry point for people interested in this issue. [www.green-alliance.org.uk/blog](http://www.green-alliance.org.uk/blog)



### NEW INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS

welcome to:

Alison Austin OBE  
Sean Birch  
Edward Coate  
Agnes Dalosi  
John Davidson OBE  
Mairi Duthie  
Alice Hands  
James Harwood  
Catherine Lecavalier  
Lewis Merdler  
Julia Plaskett  
Jennifer Powers  
Ibolya Puskas  
Jill Rutter\*  
Phillip Sellwood\*  
David Sinclair  
Alex Watson

\* donor members

### BUSINESS CIRCLE

welcome to:

Eaga plc  
Prospects Services Ltd  
Calor Gas  
General Electric

### HEAR FROM US MORE OFTEN

Green Alliance's *enews* features our commentary on key political events and updates on our work. Sign up to receive it at [www.green-alliance.org.uk](http://www.green-alliance.org.uk)

Green Alliance's mission is to promote sustainable development by ensuring that the environment is at the heart of decision-making. We work with senior people in government, business and the environmental movement to encourage new ideas, dialogue and constructive solutions.

#### staff

**Stephen Hale**  
director

**Thomas Lingard**  
deputy director

**Louise Humphrey**  
head of resources (maternity leave to August 2010)

**David Evans**  
head of resources (maternity cover to August 2010)

**Richard Booth**  
events co-ordinator

**Tracy Carty**  
senior policy adviser

**Rachel Cary**  
senior policy adviser

**Karen Crane**  
senior communications manager

**Josephine Evetts**  
pa to director and office manager

**Chris Hewett**  
associate

**Hannah Hislop**  
senior policy adviser

**Chris Littlecott**  
senior policy adviser

**Laura Mackenzie**  
policy adviser

**Rebekah Phillips**  
senior policy adviser

**Sylvia Rowley**  
policy adviser

**Faye Scott**  
senior policy adviser

**Laura Williams**  
fundraising manager

contact each staff member at:  
initialsurname@green-alliance.org.uk

#### associates

**Ian Christie, Julie Hill, Jiggy Lloyd, Derek Smith,  
Stuart Singleton-White, Sheila Watson,  
Rebecca Willis**

Green Alliance  
36 Buckingham Palace Road  
London SW1W 0RE  
T 020 7233 7433  
F 020 7233 9033  
ga@green-alliance.org.uk  
www.green-alliance.org.uk

Registered charity number 1045395 and company  
limited by guarantee (England and Wales)  
registered number 3037633



Printed by the environmental Waterless  
Offset process using vegetable-oil based  
inks on totally chlorine free paper using at  
least 51% post consumer waste.